Ben Kiernan has highlighted in his journal article in the “Journal of Contemporary Asia” on the different treatment the Khmer Rouge conducted on Vietnamese, Cham and Chinese ethnic during the Khmer Rouge regime. Ben stated that while Khmer Rouge ruthlessly targeted Vietnamese and Cham ethnic due to their racial identity, Chinese group were targeted because of being prejudiced and categorized as the city dweller/exploiting group. Unlike the former groups, the latter was prone to harsh labor, starvation and disease rather than the execution enforced by the Khmer Rouge. Ben also mentioned that “like many urban Khmer,” in the first evacuation on April 17, 1975 and the second forced transfers, “the Chinese” moved to their village of origin, mainly to “the Eastern and Southwest zone”; and, to “the Northwest Zone near the Thai border,” respectively. Ben also has conducted interviews with the survivors of Khmer Rouge regime and found out that: Chinese ethnic were kept in a village called “the Chinese village,” while the village chief was a Chinese “new person.” At the Eastern zone, Chinese ethnic were not targeted as the base people in this zone during the purge. “Chinese ethnic was not oppressed just because they were Chinese.” Ben concluded that “It may be true as a general statement to say that despite prohibition of their language and cultural autonomy, ethnic Chinese would have been safe enough in Democratic Kampuchea if they could satisfy their Khmer Rouge rulers that they were of poor social origins.”

The paper narrated that Khmer Rouge started as Khmer Issarak and received support, particularly, a massive support from Thai Government in Bangkok in 1946, and how Khmer Issarak evolved after the major aid cutoff following the Thai rightist coup in November 1947. This has caused the fractures among the Issarak, resulted in some members joined with Sihanouk to fight for “real independence” while the other received support from North Vietnam to continue their “Revolutionary Organization”. The latter group later isolated themselves from the Vietnam side, and emerged as “Democratic Kampuchea”. The group’s representative, Khieu Samphan, set in a major visits to the Asian Communist World, part of Eastern Europe and Africa in February 1974; and, during his Peking visit, he and his companion, Ieng Sary, were formally welcomed by the Chinese top leaders, Keng Piao – Director of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and his Deputy, Sen Chien, evidenced “a strong Chinese desire to give his international face.” The paper mainly cited the information provided by Ith Sarin, author of “Sranoh Proloeng Khmer,” who fled Cambodian, as well as the thesis by the Khmer Rouge leaders, Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim as well as the China’s news reporting.

The paper analyzed how China’s foreign policy created its role and powers in its weak alliance states. It suggested that Cambodia is one among the sixteen vulnerable stated, affected by the China’s “Debt Book Policy.” The paper also highlighted the three main objectives of China’s provision of foreign aids, including “reaping friendly relations and friendly economic cooperation with developing countries, enhancing South-Sourth cooperation, and contributing to development.” However, in actual practice, China has utilized its aid as a too to project its power and influence into the aid recipient countries, suggested by the many scholars.

The paper also looked into the influences of China in Cambodia, with the particular retrospective details on Chinese involvement during the Khmer Rouge era. The details, the paper suggested, were the deployment of Chinese advisors to DK and the close relations between DK and China. The paper quoted the statement of DK leaders, namely Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, praising China and treating China as the DK’s friend and brother. The study also suggested that despite the policy of neutral and independent stance without the foreign interference on DK, Pol Pot’s implementation of the policy was contrasted, and Pol Pot “stipulated the foreign policies that ran what China wanted”; DK and China had a joint communique on economic and trade development on August 1975, proclaiming the determination to unite, support each other and advance together in the common struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism and committed for the realization of full independence, sovereignty and economic development.

The paper concluded that China aided DK since it aimed to obtain at least four main favors from Pol Pot: “1) foreign policies to oppose all forms of imperialism, aggression, expansionism, intervention, and hegemonism; 2) recognition and massive support for China’s concept of the three worlds; 3) the decision to distance Cambodia from Vietnam; and, 4) permission to allow thousands of Chinese advisers and technical assistants to work in the country.” China also aimed at three benefits through the provision of massive aid to Pol Pot; they were: to get Pol Pot on its side, to mitigate the dire security threat from USSR’s encirclement policy, and to grasp the chance for influence in the Indochina peninsula by using Cambodia as its foundation. China also granted gigantic military support to Pol Pot to keep him in power to let him serve China’s strategic interest longer.

To show its supports for the battling struggle Khmer Rouge had been being through, China sent it news agency delegates to the liberated zone to witness the Khmer Rouge effort and publicize it to the Chinese audiences in March 1975. The delegation visited a number of areas, including well-known National Road 6 battleground at the northern part of Baray; Toap (Army) village in Stung Trang district and Koh Soten district, Kampong Cham province; weapon repairing factory in Kampot province; Angkor Borey district, Kampot province; Phnom Penh Frontline Battleground; Neak Loeung area; Baseth Mountain; Peam Riang Island and Mesang district in Prey Veng province; Angkor Wat Temple and Kulen Mountain in Siem Reap province; as well as Dam and other areas along Mekong River.

The delegation was warmly welcomed and guided by Khmer Rouge top ranking, namely Son Sen, Chou Chet and some other local commanders during the visit. They were shown around the temple compound in Siem Reap province, where Khmer Rouge used as its bases to fight against American-backed Lon Nol forces. The delegates had eye-witnessed the fighting tactics Khmer Rouge deployed during the battle in Peam Riang Island, where Khmer Rouge surrounded the opponents and confiscated a number of weapons and ammunitions, defeating and capturing the enemies eventually. The delegation described the Khmer Rouge struggle in a praising tone and shown emotionally supports to the Khmer Rouge forces. After the short visit, the delegation left Cambodia in April 1975, and several days later, they received the news that Khmer Rouge got the victory over their enemies and captured the country entirely.

Ben Kiernan has highlighted in his journal article in the “Journal of Contemporary Asia” on the different treatment the Khmer Rouge conducted on Vietnamese, Cham and Chinese ethnic during the Khmer Rouge regime. Ben stated that while Khmer Rouge ruthlessly targeted Vietnamese and Cham ethnic due to their racial identity, Chinese group were targeted because of being prejudiced and categorized as the city dweller/exploiting group. Unlike the former groups, the latter was prone to harsh labor, starvation and disease rather than the execution enforced by the Khmer Rouge. Ben also mentioned that “like many urban Khmer,” in the first evacuation on April 17, 1975 and the second forced transfers, “the Chinese” moved to their village of origin, mainly to “the Eastern and Southwest zone”; and, to “the Northwest Zone near the Thai border,” respectively. Ben also has conducted interviews with the survivors of Khmer Rouge regime and found out that: Chinese ethnic were kept in a village called “the Chinese village,” while the village chief was a Chinese “new person.” At the Eastern zone, Chinese ethnic were not targeted as the base people in this zone during the purge. “Chinese ethnic was not oppressed just because they were Chinese.” Ben concluded that “It may be true as a general statement to say that despite prohibition of their language and cultural autonomy, ethnic Chinese would have been safe enough in Democratic Kampuchea if they could satisfy their Khmer Rouge rulers that they were of poor social origins.”